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Abstract 
The article introduces the special issue dedicated to “The Philosophy of Information, its 
Nature and Future Developments”. It outlines the origins of the information society and then 
briefly discusses the definition of the Philosophy of Information, the possibility of 
reconciling nature and technology, the informational turn as a fourth revolution (after 
Copernicus, Darwin and Freud) and the metaphysics of the infosphere. 
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Introduction: History as the Information Age 
History has many metrics. Some are natural and circular, relying on seasons and planetary 
motions. Some are social or political and linear, being determined, for example, by the 
succession of Olympic Games, or the number of years since the founding of the city of Rome 
(ab urbe condita) or the ascension of a king. Still others are religious and have a V-shape, 
counting years before and after a particular event (e.g. the birth of Christ). There are larger 
periods that encompass smaller ones, named after influential styles (Baroque), people 
(Victorian era), particular circumstances (Cold War) or some new technology (Nuclear age). 
What all these and many other metrics have in common is that they are all historical, in the 
strict sense that they all depend on the development of systems to record events and hence 
accumulate and transmit information about the past. Thus, history is actually synonymous 
with the information age, since prehistory is the age in human development that precedes the 
availability of recording systems. One may therefore argue that humanity has been living in 
various kinds of information societies at least since the Bronze Age, the era that marks the 
invention of writing in different regions of the world, and especially in Mesopotamia (4
th
 
millennium BC). And yet, this is not what we typically mean by the information revolution. 
There may be many explanations, but one seems more convincing than any other: only very 
recently has human progress and welfare begun to depend mostly on the successful and 
efficient management of the information life-cycle.
1
  
The length of time that the information society has taken to emerge should not be 
surprising. Imagine an historian writing in a million years.
2
 She may consider it normal and 
perhaps even elegantly symmetrical that it took roughly six millennia (from its beginning in 
the Neolithic, 10
th
 millennium BC, until the Bronze Age) for the agricultural revolution to 
produce its full effect, and then another six millennia (from the Bronze Age until the end of 
the 2
nd
 millennium AC) for the information revolution to bear its main fruit.
3
 During this span 
of time, information technologies evolved from being mainly recording systems, to being also 
communication systems (especially after Guttenberg), to being also processing systems 
                                                 
1
 A typical life cycle includes the following phases: occurring (discovering, designing, authoring, etc.), 
processing and managing (collecting, validating, modifying, organising, indexing, classifying, filtering, 
updating, sorting, storing, networking, distributing, accessing, retrieving, transmitting etc.) and using 
(monitoring, modelling, analysing, explaining, planning, forecasting, decision-making, instructing, educating, 
learning, etc.). 
2
 According to recent estimates, life on Earth will be destroyed by the increase in solar temperature only in a 
billion years, so we have time, if we do not mess too much with our planet. 
3
 The relation between the agricultural and the information revolutions may be more a matter of circular return 
to our origins than a linear evolution from them if, according to the information foraging theory, human users 
search for information online by relying on ancestral foraging mechanisms that evolved in order to find food in 
a pre-agricultural society (Pirolli [2007]). 
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(especially after Turing). Thanks to this evolution, nowadays the most advanced economies 
highly depend, for their functioning and growth, on the pivotal role played by information-
based, intangible assets, information-intensive services (especially business and property 
services, communications, finance and insurance and entertainment) as well as information-
oriented public sectors (especially education, public administration and health care). For 
example, all G7 members
4
 qualify as information societies because, I would argue, in each 
case at least 70% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) depends on intangible goods, which 
are information-related, not of material goods, which are the physical output of agricultural or 
manufacturing processes.  
The almost sudden burst of a global information society, after a few millennia of 
relatively quieter gestation, has generated new and disruptive challenges, which were largely 
unforeseeable only a few decades ago. As the European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies (EGE) and the UNESCO Observatory on the Information Society have well 
documented, the information revolution has been changing the world profoundly, irreversibly 
and problematically since the fifties, at a breathtaking pace, and with unprecedented scope, 
making the creation, management and utilisation of information, communication and 
computational resources vital issues.  
To have some simple, quantitative measure of the transformations experienced by our 
generation, consider the following findings. In a recent study, researchers at Berkeley's 
School of Information Management and Systems estimated that humanity had accumulated 
approximately 12 exabytes
5
 of data in the course of its entire history until the 
commodification of computers, but that it had produced more than 5 exabytes of data just in 
2002: “print, film, magnetic, and optical storage media produced about 5 exabytes of new 
information in 2002. Ninety-two percent of the new information was stored on magnetic 
media, mostly in hard disks. [...] Five exabytes of information is equivalent in size to the 
information contained in 37,000 new libraries the size of the Library of Congress book 
collections.” (Lyman and Varian [2003]). In 2002, this was almost 800 MB of recorded data 
produced per person. It is like saying that every newborn baby came into the world with a 
burden of 30 feet of books, the equivalent of 800 MB of data on paper. This exponential 
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 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States of America. 
5
 One exabyte corresponds to 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes or 10
18
. 
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escalation has been relentless: “between 2006 and 2010 [...] the digital universe will increase 
more than six fold from 161 exabytes to 988 exabytes”.
6
  
Not feeling under pressure would be abnormal. The development of ICTs have not 
only brought enormous benefits and opportunities but also greatly outpaced our 
understanding of their conceptual nature and implications, while raising problems whose 
complexity and global dimensions are rapidly expanding, evolving and becoming 
increasingly serious. A simple analogy may help to make sense of the current situation. Our 
technological tree has been growing its far-reaching branches much more widely, rapidly and 
chaotically than its conceptual, ethical and cultural roots. The lack of balance is obvious and 
a matter of daily experience in the life of millions of citizens.
7
 The risk is that, like a tree with 
weak roots, further and healthier growth at the top might be impaired by a fragile foundation 
at the bottom. As a consequence, today, any advanced information society faces the pressing 
task of equipping itself with a viable philosophy of information (PI). Applying the previous 
analogy, while technology keeps growing bottom-up, it is high time we start digging deeper, 
top-down, in order to expand and reinforce our conceptual understanding of our information 
age, of its nature, less visible implications and its impact on human and environmental 
welfare, and thus give ourselves a chance to anticipate difficulties, identify opportunities and 
resolve problems, conflicts and dilemmas. 
It is from such a broad perspective that I would like to invite the reader to approach 
this special issue of The Information Society dedicated to “The Philosophy of Information, its 
Nature and Future Developments”. The four articles constituting the issue perfectly 
complement each other. Written by leading experts in the area, they tackle some of the key 
issues in PI, ethically (Charles Ess), epistemologically (Don Fallis and Dennis Whitcomb), 
culturally (Adam Briggle and Carl Mitcham), and information-theoretically (Leslie Willcocks 
and Edgar Whitley). Since the authors need no introduction, and the articles are well 
summarised by their abstracts, in the rest of this introduction my contribution will be to 
highlight and briefly analyse four related topics, which run across this special issue: what PI 
is, the possibility of reconciling nature and technology, the information revolution, and 
finally a philosophical interpretation of the infosphere.   
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 Source: “The Expanding Digital Universe: A Forecast of Worldwide Information Growth Through 2010”, 
white paper—sponsored by EMC—IDC, http://www.emc.com/about/destination/digital_universe/  
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 Such daily experience normally translates into dealing with information-related ethical issues, see Floridi 
[2008c].  
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2. Defining the Philosophy of Information 
PI may be defined as the philosophical field concerned with:  
a) the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, 
including its dynamics, utilisation and sciences; and  
b) the elaboration and application of information-theoretic and computational methodologies 
to philosophical problems.
8
 
The first half of the definition concerns PI as a new field. PI appropriates an explicit, 
clear and precise interpretation of the classical Socratic question “ti esti...?” (“what is...?”), 
namely “What is information?”. This is the clearest hallmark of a new field. PI provides 
critical investigations that are not to be confused with a mathematical theory of data 
communication (information theory). On the whole, its task is to develop an integrated family 
of theories that analyse, evaluate and explain the various principles and concepts of 
information, their dynamics and utilisation, giving special attention to systemic issues arising 
from different contexts of application and the interconnections with other key concepts in 
philosophy, such as knowledge, truth, meaning, reality and ethical values.  
By “dynamics of information” the definition refers to:  
i) the constitution and modelling of information environments, including their systemic 
properties, forms of interaction, internal developments, applications etc.;  
ii) information life cycles, i.e. the series of various stages of form and functional activity 
through which information can pass, from its initial occurrence to its final utilisation and 
possible disappearance; and  
iii) computation, both in the Turing-machine sense of algorithmic processing, and in the 
wider sense of information processing. This is a crucial specification. We have seen that, 
although a very old concept, information has finally acquired the nature of a primary 
phenomenon thanks to the sciences and technologies of computation and ICT. Computation 
has therefore attracted much philosophical attention in recent years. Nevertheless, PI 
privileges “information” over “computation” as the pivotal topic of the new field because it 
analyses the latter as presupposing the former. PI treats “computation” as only one (although 
very important) of the manufacturing processes in which information can be involved. 
From an environmental perspective, PI is critical and normative about what may 
count as information, and how information should be adequately created, processed, managed 
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 The definition is first introduced in Floridi [2002]. The nature and scope of PI are further discussed in Floridi 
[2003a] and Floridi [2004]. Floridi [2003b] provides an undergraduate level introduction to PI. 
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and used. Methodological and theoretical choices in information and computer sciences (ICS) 
are also profoundly influenced by the kind of PI a researcher adopts more or less consciously. 
It is therefore essential to stress that PI critically evaluates, shapes and sharpens the 
conceptual, methodological and theoretical basis of ICS, in short that it also provides a 
philosophy of ICS, as has been obvious since early work in the area of philosophy of AI. 
As we have seen above, an excessive concern with current issues may lead one to 
miss the important fact that it is perfectly legitimate to speak of a philosophy of information 
even in authors who lived a long time before the invention of computers, and hence that it 
will be extremely fruitful to develop a historical approach and trace PI’s diachronic evolution, 
as long as the technical and conceptual frameworks of ICS are not anachronistically applied, 
but are used to provide the conceptual methods and privileged perspectives useful to evaluate 
reflections that were developed on the nature, dynamics and utilisation of information well 
before the availability of digital ICTs. This is significantly comparable with the development 
undergone by other philosophical fields like the philosophy of language, the philosophy of 
biology, or the philosophy of mathematics.
9
 
The second half of the definition (point (b) above) indicates that PI is not only a new 
field, but provides an innovative methodology as well. Research into the conceptual nature of 
information, its dynamics and utilisation is carried on from the vantage point represented by 
the methodologies and theories offered by ICS and ICT. This perspective affects other 
philosophical topics as well. Information-theoretic and computational methods, concepts, 
tools and techniques have already been developed and applied in many philosophical areas. 
So far, this is a very high-level description of PI. Turning now to more specific 
aspects, one of the fundamental topics investigated by PI is whether nature (physis) and 
technology (techne) may be reconcilable. Since it is also a topic of particular relevance to this 
special issue, it deserves its own separate discussion. 
 
                                                 
9
 See Adams [2003] for a reconstruction of the informational turn in philosophy. 
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3. The Marriage of Physis and Techne 
According to PI, whether physis and techne may be reconcilable is not a question that has a 
predetermined answer, waiting to be divined. It is more like a practical problem, whose 
feasible solution needs to be devised. With an analogy, we are not asking whether two 
chemicals could mix but rather whether a marriage may be successful. There is plenty of 
room for a positive answer, provided the right sort of commitment is made.  
It seems beyond doubt that a successful marriage between physis and techne is vital 
and hence worth our effort. Information societies increasingly depend upon technology to   
thrive, but they equally need a healthy, natural environment to flourish. Try to imagine the 
world not tomorrow or next year, but next century, or next millennium: a divorce between 
physis and techne would be utterly disastrous both for our welfare and for the wellbeing of 
our habitat. This is something that technophiles and green fundamentalists must come to 
understand. Failing to negotiate a fruitful, symbiotic relationship between technology and 
nature is not an option. Fortunately, a successful marriage between physis and techne is 
achievable. True, much more progress needs to be made. The physics of information can be 
highly energy-consuming and hence potentially unfriendly towards the environment. In 2000, 
data centres consumed 0.6% of the world's electricity. In 2005, the figure had raised to 1%. 
They are now responsible for more carbon-dioxide emissions per year than Argentina or the 
Netherlands and, if current trends hold, their emissions will have grown four-fold by 2020, 
reaching 670m tonnes. By then, it is estimated that ICTs’ carbon footprint will be higher than 
aviation’s.
10
 However, ICTs will also help “to eliminate 7.8 metric gigatons of greenhouse 
gas emissions annually by 2020 equivalent to 15 percent of global emissions today and five 
times more than our estimate of the emissions from these technologies in 2020”.
11
 This 
positive (and improvable) balance leads me to a final comment. 
The greenest machine is a machine with 100% energy efficiency. Unfortunately, this 
is equivalent to a perpetual motion machine and the latter is simply a pipe dream. However, 
we also know that such an impossible limit can be increasingly approximated: energy waste 
can be dramatically reduced and energy efficiency can be highly increased (the two processes 
are not necessarily the same; compare recycling vs. doing more with less). Often, both kinds 
of processes may be fostered only by relying on significant improvements in the management 
of information (e.g. to build and run hardware and processes better). So here is how we may 
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 Source: The Economist May 22nd, 2008. 
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 Source: McKinsey’s Information Technology Report, October 2008, “How IT can cut carbon emissions”, by 
Giulio Boccaletti, Markus Löffler, and Jeremy M. Oppenheim. 
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reinterpret Socrates’ ethical intellectualism: we do evil because we do not know better, in the 
sense that the better the information management is the less moral evil is caused. With a 
proviso though: some ethical theories, especially in the Christian tradition, seem to assume 
that the moral game, played by agents in their environments, may be won absolutely, i.e. not 
in terms of higher scores, but by scoring perhaps very little as long as no moral loss or error 
occurs, a bit like winning a football game by scoring only one goal as long as none is 
received. It seems that this absolute view has led different parties to underestimate the 
importance of successful compromises (imagine an environmentalist unable to accept any 
technology responsible for some level of carbon-dioxide emission, no matter how it may 
counterbalanced it). The more realistic and challenging view is that moral evil is unavoidable, 
so that the real effort lies in limiting it and counterbalancing it with more moral goodness. 
ICTs can help us in our fight against the destruction, impoverishment, vandalism and 
waste of both natural and human (including historical and cultural) resources. So they can be 
a precious ally in what I have called elsewhere
12
 synthetic environmentalism or e-
nvironmentalism. We should resist any Greek epistemological tendency to treat techne as the 
Cinderella of knowledge; any absolutist inclination to accept no moral balancing between 
some unavoidable evil and more goodness; or any modern, reactionary, metaphysical 
temptation to drive a wedge between naturalism and constructionism by privileging the 
former as the only authentic dimension of human life. The challenge is to reconcile our roles 
as agents within nature and as stewards of nature. The good news is that it is a challenge we 
can meet. The odd thing is that we are slowly coming to realise that we have such a hybrid 
nature. A turning point in this process of self-understanding is what I have defined as the 
fourth revolution (Floridi [2008a]). 
 
4. The Fourth Revolution 
Science has two fundamental ways of changing our understanding. One may be called 
extrovert, or about the world, and the other introvert, or about ourselves. Three scientific 
revolutions have had great impact in both ways. They changed not only our understanding of 
the external world, but also our conception of who we are. After Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–
1543), the heliocentric cosmology displaced the Earth and hence humanity from the centre of 
the universe. Charles Darwin (1809–1882) showed that all species of life have evolved over 
time from common ancestors through natural selection, thus displacing humanity from the 
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 See the Preface to Floridi [2008d]. 
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centre of the biological kingdom. And following Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), we 
acknowledge nowadays that the mind is also unconscious and subject to the defence 
mechanism of repression. So we are not immobile, at the centre of the universe (Copernican 
revolution), we are not unnaturally separate and diverse from the rest of the animal kingdom 
(Darwinian revolution), and we are very far from being Cartesian minds entirely transparent 
to ourselves (Freudian revolution). 
Freud [1917] was the first
13
 to interpret these three revolutions as part of a single 
process of reassessment of human nature. In a similar way, when we now perceive that 
something very significant and profound has happened to human life after the informational 
turn, I would argue that our intuition is correct, because we are experiencing what may be 
described as a fourth revolution, in the process of dislocation and reassessment of humanity’s 
fundamental nature and role in the universe. We do not know whether we may be the only 
intelligent form of life. But we are now slowly accepting the idea that we might be 
informational organisms (inforgs, see Floridi [2007]) among many others, significantly but 
not dramatically different from natural entities and agents and smart, engineered artefacts. It 
seems that, in view of this important change in our self-understanding – and of the sort of 
ICT-mediated interactions that we will increasingly enjoy with other agents, whether 
biological or artificial – the best way of tackling the new ethical challenges posed by ICTs 
may be from an environmental approach, one which does not privilege the natural or 
untouched, but treats as authentic and genuine all forms of existence and behaviour, even 
those based on artificial, synthetic or engineered artefacts. This sort of holistic 
environmentalism requires a change in our metaphysical perspective, the topic of the next 
section. 
 
5. The Metaphysics of the Infosphere 
Within the information society, it seems that we are modifying our ontological perspective, 
from a materialist one, in which physical objects and processes still play a key role, to an 
informational one, in which (a) objects and processes are dephysicalised, typified and 
perfectly clonable; (b) the right of usage is perceived to be at least as important as the right to 
ownership; and (c) the criterion for existence is no longer being immutable (Greek 
metaphysics) or being potentially subject to perception (modern metaphysics) but being 
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 See now Weinert [2009]. 
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interactable. If all this seems a bit too “metaphysical”, let me provide an illustrative 
example.
14
  
Despite some important exceptions (e.g. vases and metal tools in ancient civilizations 
or books after Guttenberg), it was the industrial revolution that really marked the passage 
from a nominalist world of unique objects to a Platonist world of types of objects, all 
perfectly reproducible as identical to each other, therefore epistemically indiscernible, and 
hence pragmatically dispensable because replaceable without any loss. Today, we find it 
obvious that two automobiles may be virtually identical and that we are invited to buy a 
model rather than a specific “incarnation” of it. Indeed, we are fast moving towards a 
commodification of objects that considers repair as synonymous with replacement, even 
when it comes to entire buildings. This has led, by way of compensation, to a prioritization of 
branding – a a process compared by Klein [2000] to the creation of “cultural accessories and 
personal philosophies” – and of re-appropriation: the person who puts a sticker on the 
window of her car, which is otherwise perfectly identical to thousands of others, is fighting 
an anti-Platonic battle. The information revolution has further exacerbated this process. Once 
our window-shopping becomes Windows-shopping and no longer means walking down the 
street but browsing through the web, the problem caused by the dephysicalization and 
typification of individuals as unique and irreplaceable entities starts eroding our sense of 
personal identity as well. We become mass-produced, anonymous entities among other 
anonymous entities, exposed to billions of other similar inforgs online. So we self-brand and 
re-appropriate ourselves in cyberspace by blogs and facebook entries, homepages, youtube 
videos, and flickr albums. We use and expose information about ourselves to become less 
informationally indiscernible. We wish to maintain a high level of informational privacy 
almost as if that were the only way of saving a precious capital that can then be publicly 
invested by us in order to construct ourselves as individuals discernible by others.  Now, 
processes such as the one I have just sketched are part of a far deeper metaphysical drift 
caused by the information revolution. And PI is the sort of approach we need to develop if we 
wish to tackle the challenges posed by such profound transformations.  
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